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SUMMARY
The post-World War II U.S.-Japan alli-
ance has long been an anchor of the U.S.
security role in East Asia.  The alliance, with
its access to bases in Japan, where about
53,000 U.S. troops are stationed, facilitates the
forward deployment of U.S. military forces in
the Asia-Pacific, thereby undergirding U.S.
national security strategy.  For Japan, the
alliance and the U.S. nuclear umbrella provide
maneuvering room in dealing with its neigh-
bors, particularly China and North Korea. 
In 2005, Congress showed a renewed
interest in U.S.-Japan relations.  In recent
months, Members have expressed particular
interest in Japan’s ban on imports of U.S.
beef, Japan’s deteriorating relations with
China and South Korea, and Japanese politics,
including the battle to succeed Prime Minister
Junichiro Koizumi, who says he will step
down in September 2006.  
The Bush Administration has made
significant strides in its goals of broadening
U.S.-Japan strategic cooperation and encour-
aging Japan to assume a more active interna-
tional role.  Following the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks, Japan made its first-ever
military deployments in noncombat support of
U.S. and allied forces in Afghanistan.
Koizumi also was a prominent backer of the
U.S. invasion of Iraq and in 2004 Tokyo sent
noncombat troops to Iraq, despite considerable
domestic opposition.  Japan generally has
supported the “hardline” U.S. position in the
Six-Party Talks on North Korea’s nuclear
program.  Japan is participating in bilateral
missile defense research and development.  In
2005 the U.S. and Japan announced a sweep-
ing new agreement to strengthen military
cooperation.  The plan calls for U.S. forces to
be realigned and Japan to take on a more
active (non-combat) role in maintaining re-
gional and global security. The envisioned
changes are intended to complement the
broader Pentagon goal of deploying a more
streamlined and mobile force in Asia. 
Most of these developments have been
viewed warily by South Korea and opposed
outright by China.  Beijing and Seoul also
have expressed concern at the assertive for-
eign policy stance adopted by Koizumi, who
has been buoyed by a heightened sense of
nationalism and vulnerability (to North Korea
and China) among many Japanese.  In addition
to pursuing closer relations with Washington,
Tokyo has accelerated its bid for a permanent
seat on the U.N. Security Council.  Koizumi’s
party also has drafted a new constitution that
would eliminate most of the clauses prohibit-
ing participation in collective security arrange-
ments.  The United States has supported both
moves.  Sino-Japanese and Korean-Japanese
tensions also have risen due to competing
territorial claims and accusations that Japan is
attempting to whitewash its history of aggres-
sion during the first half of the 20th Century.
Japan is one of the United States’ most
important economic partners.  Outside of
North America, it is the United States’ largest
export market and second-largest source of
imports.  Japanese firms are the U.S.’ second-
largest source of foreign direct investment,
and Japanese investors are by far the largest
foreign holders of U.S. treasuries, helping to
finance the U.S. deficit and reduce upward
pressure on U.S. interest rates.  Bilateral trade
friction has decreased in recent years, partly
because U.S. concern about the trade deficit
with Japan has been replaced by concern
about a much larger deficit with China. The
exception was U.S. criticism over Japan’s




Negotiators have been unable to resolve differences to lift Japan’s ban on U.S. beef
imports due to ongoing doubts about U.S. safety and inspection procedures.   In March,
Japan became concerned when Hong Kong suspended beef imports from a U.S. firm due to
pieces of bone in a shipment, a violation of guidelines to prevent the disease in humans.  In
addition, both the United States and Japan confirmed new cases of “mad-cow disease” in
beef cattle.  On March 10, 2006, U.S. Agriculture Secretary Mike Johanns met with his
Japanese counterpart, Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries Minister Shoichi  Nakagawa, in
London and indicated that the United States was looking into the U.S. meat inspection
procedures and how prohibited material got into a shipment to Japan that caused Japan to
impose the latest ban.  The two officials did not indicate when the ban could be lifted.      
In the midst of rising tension, Japanese and Chinese leaders failed to reach agreement
on the disputed oil and gas deposits in the East China Sea.  China rejected Japan’s proposal
to jointly develop the area, citing disagreement with the suggested demarcation line.
However, Chinese President Hu Jintao met with a visiting Japanese group that included
former Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto on a tour to promote better Sino-Japanese
relations.  In recent months there have been similar “track two” efforts to improve ties.
Japanese voters in Yamaguchi Prefecture overwhelmingly rejected a non-binding
referendum on expanding the local Iwakuni base to accommodate anticipated U.S. military
realignments in Japan.  Although officials claimed it would not affect plans to go forward,
it may have been indicative of further local opposition to the realignment.  Further talks with
the United States on the realignment were postponed until April as local leaders continued
to voice disagreements with the central government’s plans. Japanese Foreign Minister Taro
Aso joined Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice and Australian Foreign Minister Alexander
Downer in Australia for the inaugural session of the Trilateral Security Dialogue between the
three democracies.  Despite earlier reports that Japan
planned to withdraw most of the approximately 600
soldiers stationed in southern Iraq, officials said they
were reluctant to pull troops out before the Iraqis
established a stable government.  
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
The Role of Congress in U.S.-
Japan Relations
Congressional powers, actions, and oversight
form a backdrop against which both the
Administration and the Japanese government must
formulate their policies. In 2005, Congress showed
a renewed interest in U.S.-Japan relations.  After
holding two Japan-specific public hearings from
Japan Country Data
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% of Population over 64: 19.5% (U.S. =
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purchasing power parity
Primary Export Partners: US 22.7%,
China 13.1%, South Korea 7.8%,
Taiwan 7.4% (2004)
Primary Import Partners: China 20.7%,
US 14%, South Korea 4.9%,
Australia 4.3% (2004)
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2001 through 2004, Congress held three in 2005.  In 2004 and 2005, Members of Congress
were particularly critical of Japan’s two-year ban on imports of U.S. beef — which was
partially lifted in December 2005 — and of the Bush Administration’s handling of the beef
dispute.  On security issues, Members have expressed concern that steps taken by the
Japanese government are harming U.S. interests in East Asia by worsening Sino-Japanese
and South Korean-Japanese relations. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s continued visits
to Yasukuni Shrine, which enshrines the names of several Class A war criminals from World
War II, has come under particular criticism.  Relatedly, some Members have called attention
to signs that revisionist views of World War II and the U.S. Occupation of Japan (1945-52)
increasingly are seeping into the mainstream in Japan.  The Bush Administration’s reaction
to and role in fostering these developments also have begun to come under greater
congressional scrutiny.  Congressional attention also has focused on Japan’s increased
diplomatic and military assertiveness, as well as dramatic political developments in Japan
in 2005 and 2006.  (See also the “Legislation” section.)
Major Diplomatic and Security Issues1
The dominant theme in U.S.-Japan relations for the past five years has been deepened
alliance cooperation across a range of issues since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.
Prior to traveling to Asia in November 2005, President Bush described Prime Minister
Junichiro Koizumi as “one of the best friends that I have in the international arena.” During
the one-day summit between the two leaders in Kyoto in November 2005, Prime Minister
Koizumi said that the closer U.S.-Japan relations are, the “easier for us [Japan] to behave and
establish better relations with China, with South Korea and other nations in Asia.”  
Global Issues
Counterterrorism Cooperation.  Following the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, the Koizumi government initiated a series of unprecedented measures to protect
American facilities in Japan and provide non-lethal, “rear area” logistical support to U.S.
military operations against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan.  The latter mainly took
the form of at-sea replenishment of fuel oil and water to U.S., British, French, and other
allied warships operating in the Indian Ocean.  The dispatch of Japan’s Maritime Self-
Defense Forces (MSDF) was the first such deployment since World War II.  From late 2001
through March 2005, a small flotilla of Japanese transport ships, oilers, and destroyers
provided about 30% of the fuel used by U.S. and allied warships, and Japan’s Air Self-
Defense Force (ASDF) conducted hundreds of airlift support missions for U.S. forces.  On
June 10, 2005, the Japanese government decided to extend its anti-terrorism law for two
years but to reduce its Indian Ocean deployment to only one escort ship.  This effectively
brought to an end the post-9/11 role of the MSDF operations in the Indian Ocean and Persian
Gulf. After the United States, Japan also has been the leading donor country for Afghan relief
and reconstruction.
Support for U.S. Policy Toward Iraq.   While strongly preferring a clear United
Nations role in resolving the U.S./British confrontation with Iraq, Japan nonetheless gave
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almost unqualified support to the Bush Administration’s position. During an open debate in
the U.N. Security Council, Japan was one of only two out of 27 participating countries (the
other being Australia) to support the U.S. contention that even if the U.N. inspections were
strengthened and expanded, they were unlikely to lead to the elimination of Iraq’s weapons
of mass destruction.  Since 2003, Japan has provided $1.5 billion in grant assistance to Iraq,
has pledged to provide $3.5 billion in yen loans, and has agreed to a phased cancellation of
80% of the approximately $7.5 billion in debt Iraq owed Japan.  In addition, the Koizumi
government has deployed about 600 military personnel — mainly ground troops — to carry
out humanitarian aid and reconstruction activities in Iraq.  In December 2005, the Japanese
Cabinet extended Japan’s deployment of troops to the southern Iraqi city of Samawah for one
year.  When discussing the announcement, Prime Minister Koizumi hinted that Japan would
likely withdraw its troops if Australian and British troops withdraw in 2006.  Australian
troops, along with the Dutch, have provided military protection for the Japanese deployment.
Although not confirmed by Japanese officials, anonymous U.S. officials have said that Japan
has expressed interest in heading up a “provincial reconstruction team,” or PRT,  a program
proposed by the State Department to rebuild the country through locally-directed efforts.  If
participating, Japan would be expected to provide its own airlift and other logistical needs.
United Nations Security Council Reform.  In 2004, Japan accelerated its
longstanding efforts to become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council
by forming a coalition with Germany, India, and Brazil (the so-called “G-4”) to achieve non-
veto membership for all four countries.  Though the Bush Administration has backed Japan’s
bid,2 it did not support the G-4 proposal and opposed taking a vote on expanding the Security
Council until a “broader consensus” on reforming the entire organization can be reached.
After the G-4 bid failed in the run-up to the U.N.’s Millennium Summit in September 2005,
Prime Minister Koizumi reportedly told Secretary General Kofi Annan that in the future
Japan would have to coordinate more closely with the United States to achieve its goal.  To
become a new member, Japan needs to obtain support from two-thirds (128 countries) of all
the U.N. member countries.  Japan is the second-largest contributor to the U.N. regular
budget, paying more than 20% of the total, more than twice the percentage paid by the third-
largest contributor.  After investigations revealed that mismanagement had allowed millions
of dollars to be lost to corruption in the oil-for-food program for Iraq, Japan threatened to
withhold part of its funding if drastic reforms were not adopted. 
Kyoto Protocol and Climate Change.  Japan is the fourth-leading producer of so-
called greenhouse gases after the United States, the Russian Federation, and China.  Under
the Kyoto Protocol, which Tokyo ratified in 2002, Japan is obligated to reduce its emissions
to 6% below its 1990 levels by 2010.  Japanese industry shares many of the concerns of U.S.
industry about the cost and feasibility of achieving these reductions, but the Japanese
government, which places a high value on its support of the protocol, has expressed dismay
over the Bush Administration’s decision to back away from the protocol.  In 2005, Japan
joined with the United States, China, India, South Korea, and Australia in a new, non-
binding, agreement.  The Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate calls
on the six nations to cooperate on the development and diffusion of technology to combat
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climate change, reduce pollution, and promote energy security.  The group is designed to
“complement, but not replace, the Kyoto Protocol.”  Some environmentalists have criticized
the arrangement for its absence of mandates — particularly on greenhouse gas emissions —
and for being a part of a suspected U.S. strategy to prevent the Kyoto Protocol from being
renewed after it expires in 2012. 
Regional and Historical Issues
Converging Korean Peninsula Priorities.  Japan’s policy toward North Korea has
hardened in recent years, drawing it closer to the U.S. position in the ongoing Six-Party Talks
on Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program.  Japan has insisted on North Korea abandoning
its nuclear weapons, promising substantial aid in return; has taken steps to squeeze North
Korea economically; and participates in the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).
Several prominent Japanese have called for Tokyo to impose sanctions against North Korea,
a step opposed by Koizumi and the Bush Administration.   The issue of Japanese citizens
kidnapped in the 1970s and 1980s by North Korean agents has largely driven Tokyo’s harder
position.  The Bush Administration and Congress have supported Japan’s insistence on a full
accounting of the fate of those abducted.  The North Korean Human Rights Act  (P.L.
108-333), passed by the 108th Congress and signed by President Bush in October 2004,
requires that U.S. nonhumanitarian assistance to North Korea depend on “substantial
progress” toward fully disclosing information on the abductees.  
At the same time, Japan has reportedly encouraged the United States to adopt a more
flexible position; after a Koizumi-Bush meeting at the June 2004 G-8 Summit, the Bush
Administration submitted its first and only detailed negotiating position at the Six-Party
Talks.  Additionally, outside the framework of the Talks, Koizumi has pursued an
independent channel of diplomacy with North Korea, holding summits with North Korean
leader Kim Jong-il in September 2002 and May 2004.  Koizumi has not ruled out
normalizing relations between the two countries, which have never had official relations,
though he has made this contingent upon the settlement of the nuclear and abduction issues.
Normalization talks restarted in late 2005.3
Japan-China Rivalry.  Despite extensive economic ties, relations between China and
Japan, always uneasy, have become increasingly strained.  Political tensions are high on a
variety of sovereignty-related issues, and many observers see a potentially destabilizing spike
in nationalist animosity toward Japan among Chinese.  In April 2005, large-scale anti-
Japanese demonstrations broke out in at least nine Chinese cities, including a violent protest
in Shanghai that damaged the Japanese consulate as well as shops that catered to the large
Japanese expatriate community.  Many observers noted that the Chinese authorities were
unusually passive in allowing the protesters to organize, fueling speculation that Beijing
quietly encouraged the demonstrations.  
Beijing and Tokyo have faced a series of confrontations over the territorial rights of
areas in the East China Sea, which is potentially rich in oil and gas reserves.  Japan considers
the area surrounding the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands to be part of its Exclusive Economic Zone
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(EEZ).  The Japanese Self Defense Force has detected periodic Chinese military activities
in the area, including a submarine incursion close to Okinawa and a fleet of warships near
a disputed gas field.  Beijing has criticized the strengthening U.S.-Japan security relationship
and Japan’s increasingly public concern for Taiwan’s security. In another indication of
shifting relations, Japan has cut its assistance to China in half since 2000.
Historical Issues Divide Asian Powers.  Historical grievances, particularly those
centered around Japan’s behavior during and preceding World War II, continue to aggravate
Japan’s relationships with its neighbors.  The most consistently divisive issue involves the
visits of Japanese politicians to the Yasukuni Shrine, a Shinto shrine that honors Japanese
soldiers who died in war.  Those enshrined include several Class A war criminals.  Chinese
leaders have emphasized repeatedly that Prime Minister Koizumi’s Yasukuni visits constitute
a huge stumbling block in moving political relations forward.  Koizumi’s fifth annual visit
to Yasukuni, in October 2005, again drew angry protests from Asian leaders: both Beijing
and Seoul cancelled upcoming bilateral meetings with the Japanese, but no widespread
demonstrations occurred in China.  In a sign that the debate over Yasukuni is intensifying
among the Japanese elite, two of Japan’s most influential newspapers, the Yomiuri Shimbun
and the Asahi Shimbun, called for the establishment of a non-political alternative  shrine that
excludes the Class A war criminals.
 
In a related vein, Japan has come under fire for some of its history textbooks for school
children.  China insists that the texts misrepresent Japan’s past by downplaying the atrocities
committed by Japanese soldiers against civilian populations.  South Korea also has
complained about Japanese history textbooks, the Yasukuni visits, and a perceived failure
by Japan to compensate Korean “comfort women” who were recruited to provide sexual
services for Japanese troops during World War II.    Although the Japan-South Korean
disputes generally are regarded as more manageable than Sino-Japan tensions, the
disagreements over history are a major obstacle  to improved Japan-South Korean ties, often
referred to as the “weak link” in the U.S. triangle of alliances in Northeast Asia.
Furthermore, the question of Japan’s historical legacy also has affected Korean and Chinese
views of the United States.  Both countries have criticized the Bush Administration for its
silence regarding the controversy over the Yasukuni shrine  and Japan’s record in accounting
for its past history of aggression.  In November 2005, President Bush discussed rising
regional tensions during his bilateral summits with Koizumi and the leaders of China and
South Korea.  During a trip to Japan and China in January 2006, Deputy Secretary of State
Robert Zoellick suggested that Chinese, Japan, and U.S. historians engage in “track two”
efforts to examine the history of World War II.
In a move that could open the door to disagreements between Japanese nationalists and
members of the U.S. Congress, in July 2005 the U.S. House of Representatives passed
H.Con.Res. 191, which commemorated the 60th anniversary of the end of the Pacific War.
The resolution stated that Congress reaffirmed the judgments rendered by the international
war crimes tribunal in Tokyo after World War II, including the conviction of Japanese
leaders for “crimes against humanity.”
Claims of Former World War II POWs and Civilian Internees. Congress has
indicated interest in another issue in which the U.S. and Japanese governments have been in
essential agreement.  A number of surviving American World War II Prisoners of War
(POWs) and civilian internees who were forced to work for Japanese companies — including
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Mitsui, Nippon Steel, and Mitsubishi — during the war have filed suits in Japan and
California seeking compensation of $20,000 for each POW or internee for forced labor and
torture.  Former POWs and civilian internees were paid about $1.00-2.50 for each day of
internment from a fund of seized Japanese assets administered by a War Claims Commission
(WCC) established by Congress in 1948.  Thus far, the Japanese courts and the U.S. Court
of Claims have dismissed the suits on grounds that Japan’s obligations to pay compensation
were eliminated by Article 14 of the 1951 Multilateral Peace Treaty with Japan.  The
Departments of State and Justice support the position of the Japanese government, but some
Members of Congress have sided with the plaintiffs.  The core issue is whether the Peace
Treaty with Japan relieved only the Japanese government from future claims or whether it
covered private companies as well.  A number of bills and amendments introduced in
Congress sought to block the executive branch from upholding the supremacy of the Peace
Treaty in civil suits.  None have been enacted, in part due to opposition from the Bush
Administration.4  
Military Issues5
Deepening Cooperation.  Japan and the United States are military allies under a
security treaty concluded in 1951 and revised in 1960.  Under the treaty, Japan grants the
United States military base rights on its territory in return for a U.S. pledge to protect Japan’s
security.  In October 2005, at a Security Consultative Committee meeting (SCC, also known
as the 2+2 meeting) of the Japanese and U.S. foreign and defense ministers, the two sides
released an interim report, Transformation and Realignment for the Future, announcing
several significant steps that will expand the alliance beyond its existing framework.  As U.S.
personnel and facilities in Japan are realigned as part of the broader Pentagon strategy of
deploying a more streamlined and mobile force, Japan is to take a more active role in
contributing to global stability, primarily through increased coordination with the U.S.
military.  Key features of the new arrangement include a reduction in the number of U.S.
Marines in Japan, the relocation of a problematic air base in Okinawa, the deployment of a
an X-Band radar system in Japan as part of a missile defense system, expanded bilateral
cooperation in training and intelligence sharing, and Japan’s acceptance of a nuclear-powered
aircraft carrier in the Yokosuka Naval Base.  Many of the agreement’s most controversial
elements are likely to face continued obstacles, particularly from local Japanese politicians
in the areas identified to host new facilities and troops.  In March 2006, 89% of voters in
Yamaguchi prefecture voted against expanding the Iwakuni base to accommodate more U.S.
troops in a non-binding referendum, and scheduled talks on the realignment were postponed.
The most recent overhaul builds upon the 1997 revised defense cooperation guidelines
that grant the U.S. military greater use of Japanese installations in time of crisis and refer to
a possible, limited Japanese military role in “situations in areas surrounding Japan.”  At the
“2 + 2” meeting in February 2005, Secretaries Rice and Rumsfeld, along with their Japanese
counterparts, outlined a more global and integrated vision of the alliance, specifically
mentioning issues related to the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Straits as “common
strategic objectives” for “peaceful resolution.” Defense officials continue to stress, however,
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that the Japanese military will not be involved in combat missions but instead limit its
contributions to logistical support for counterterrorism operations or to humanitarian and
reconstruction efforts.
In recent years Japan has edged closer to a more independent self-defense posture in
both practice and in published security strategies.  Japan’s National Defense Program
Guidelines (NDPG) approved in December 2004 call on Japan to become more engaged
militarily in the Indian Ocean region from the Middle East to Southeast Asia, permit military
exports to the United States for development of joint missile defense, mention China as a
security problem (the first such mention in a five-year plan), and increase the size of rapid
reaction forces, whose main mission is to prevent infiltration from North Korea.  
Article 9 Restrictions.  In general, Japan’s U.S.-drafted constitution remains a major
obstacle to closer U.S.-Japan defense cooperation because of a prevailing constitutional
interpretation of Article 9 that forbids engaging in “collective defense”; that is, combat
cooperation with the United States against a third country. Article 9 outlaws war as a
“sovereign right” of Japan and prohibits “the right of belligerency.”  It provides that “land,
sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential will never be maintained.”  Whereas in the
past, Japanese public opinion strongly supported the limitations placed on the Self-Defense
Force (SDF), this opposition has softened considerably in recent years.  (See “Constitutional
Revision”). Since 1991, Japan has allowed the SDF to participate in non-combat roles in a
number of United Nations peacekeeping missions and in the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq.
Japan’s agreement in 2005 to house a new, nuclear-powered carrier in Yokosuka beginning
in 2008 after the existing carrier is decommissioned has sparked local protests. 
Proposed Command Structure Changes.  The October 2005 interim report
outlines major command changes agreed to by Japanese and U.S. officials.  One would shift
300 soldiers from the 1st Army Corps headquarters from Washington State to Camp Zama
to establish a deployable headquarters.  The Ground Self Defense Forces would also base a
rapid-response headquarters at Camp Zama.  A bilateral and joint operations center is to be
built at Yokota Air Base (about 23 miles northwest of Tokyo) to enhance coordination
between the Japanese and U.S. air and missile defense command elements. The headquarters
of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force, meanwhile, would be moved from Okinawa to Guam,
reducing the number of marines in Okinawa by about 7,000.
U.S. Bases on Okinawa.  The reduction of marines from about 18,000 to 11,000 on
Okinawa seeks to quell the political controversy that has surrounded the presence of U.S.
forces on the island for years.  Public outcry against the bases has continued since the 1995
rape of a Japanese schoolgirl by American servicemen, which galvanized underlying
resentments.  Though constituting less than 1% of Japan’s land mass, Okinawa currently
hosts 65% of the total U.S. forces in Japan.  Okinawan politicians have called for a
renegotiation of the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and a reduction in U.S.
troop strength.  The U.S. and Japanese governments oppose revising the SOFA, but have
acknowledged the political demand to alleviate the burden of military presence in Okinawa.
As part of the realignment of U.S. bases, U.S. officials agreed to move most aircraft and
crews constituting the marine air station at Futenma to expanded facilities at Camp Schwab,
located in Nago, a less-congested area of Okinawa.  Campaigns for Nago’s January mayoral
election indicated resistance to the relocation, as all candidates criticized the plan.
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Disagreements over the relocation of the Futenma air station had stalled the implementation
of a 1996 U.S.-Japanese Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) agreement under
which the U.S. military would relinquish some bases and land on Okinawa (21% of the total
land in the bases) over seven years.    
Burden-Sharing Issues.  The United States has pressed Japan to increase its share
of the costs of American troops and bases.  According to a Pentagon report, in 2004, Japan
provided $4.4 billion in direct and indirect Host Nation Support (HNS), which is 75% of the
total cost of maintaining troops in Japan.  In 2004, Japanese officials reportedly suggested
that HNS be reduced on grounds that Japan is now making a greater direct contribution to
the alliance.  In January, Japan renewed its pledge to provide $1.2 billion in direct support
for each of the next two years to U.S. forces amid controversy over how much of the cost of
relocating forces will be shouldered by Japan.  The key sticking point is the estimated $7.6
billion price tag of relocating 7,000 U.S. Marines from Okinawa to Guam.
Cooperation on Missile Defense.  A U.S.-Japan program of cooperative research
and development of anti-ballistic missiles began in 1999.  Proponents of missile defense
justify it on the basis of North Korea’s missile program, but China opposes the program.
Prime Minister Koizumi announced in December 2003 that Japan would acquire the ground-
based U.S. Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) system and the ship-based U.S. Standard
Missile-3 system.  The Defense Agency reportedly plans to begin deploying the missile
defense system around major Japanese cities by March 2007.  In December 2005, the Agency
announced that Japan will pay over $1 billion for the project over nine years.
Economic Issues6
Despite Japan’s long economic slump, trade and other economic ties with Japan remain
highly important to U.S. national interests and, therefore, to the U.S. Congress.7  By the most
conventional method of measurement, the United States and Japan are the world’s two
largest economies,8 accounting for around 40% of world gross domestic product (GDP), and
their mutual relationship not only has an impact on each other but on the world as a whole.
Furthermore, their economies are intertwined by merchandise trade, trade in services, and
foreign investments.
Although Japan remains important economically to the United States, its importance
has slid as it has been edged out by other trade partners. Japan is the United States’s third-
largest merchandise export market (behind Canada and Mexico) and the fourth-largest source
for U.S. merchandise imports (behind Canada, Mexico, and China) as of the first six months
of 2005.  At one time Japan was the largest source of foreign direct investment in the United
States, but, as of the end of 2004, it was the second largest source (behind the United
Kingdom).  It was the fifth-largest target for U.S. foreign direct investment abroad as of the
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end of 2004.  The United States remains Japan’s largest export market and second-largest
source of imports as of the end of July 2005.
Japan’s domestic economic conditions have influenced the U.S.-Japan economic
agenda.  Except for some brief periods, Japan had incurred stagnant or negative economic
growth in the 1990s and the first few years of this decade.  However, Japan recently has
shown signs of achieving sustained economic recovery.    
Some long-standing trade disputes continue to irritate the relationship.  The U.S.
bilateral trade deficit with Japan reached $81.3 billion in 2000.  However, in 2001, the U.S.
trade deficit declined 15%, primarily because of the slowdown in the U.S. economy, but
increased moderately to $70.1 billion in 2002.  The trade deficit  decreased slightly to $66.0
billion in 2003 but increased to $75.2 billion in 2004.  The U.S. trade deficit in 2005 with
Japan may break the record set in 2000.  (See Table 1.) 
There have been complaints from U.S. industry and certain Members of Congress about
the Japanese government’s massive intervention in currency markets in 2003 and early 2004
to slow the Japanese yen’s appreciation against the U.S. dollar.  Some legislation has been
introduced regarding the alleged currency manipulation.  While many of the bills target
China’s exchange rate practice, some do refer to Japan.  For example, S. 377 (Lieberman),
The Fair Currency Enforcement Act of 2005, lists Japan as a country, among others, that has
implemented exchange rate policies that give its exports an unfair competitive advantage in
the U.S. market, and the bill states that experts have estimated that the yen is undervalued
by about at least 20%.  The bill would authorize the President to take actions under U.S.
trade laws to retaliate, if a country is found to be manipulating its currency values.9 
In addition, the recent announcement by the Ford Corporation of factory closings and
the layoff of some 30,000 auto employees exemplified growing problems of the U.S.-based
auto industry.  In a November 22, 2005 speech he delivered at the National Press Club, Ford
Chairman Bill Ford stated among other things that U.S. auto manufacturers face the financial
burdens of pension costs and health care benefits that Japanese auto companies, such as
Toyota, do not face because the Japanese government finances these costs, thereby placing
the burden on the whole society and not just on Japanese business.  While Ford’s argument
for his company’s problems is subject to debate, his remarks may signify the  re-emergence
of Japanese industrial policy as a point of contention in the bilateral relationship.
Table 1.  U.S. Trade with Japan, Selected Years
($ billions)
Year Exports Imports Balances
1995 64.3 123.5 - 59.1
2000 65.3 146.6 - 81.3
2003 52.1 118.0 -66.0
2004 54.4 129.6 -75.2
2005 55.4 138.1 -82.7
Source: U.S. Commerce Department, Census Bureau.  FT900.  Exports are total exports valued
on a free alongside ship (f.a.s.) basis. Imports are general imports valued on a customs basis.
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Japan’s Ban on U.S. Beef.10    On January 20, 2006, Japan reimposed a ban on beef
imports from the United States after having lifted it on December 12, 2005. Japan re-imposed
the ban after government inspectors found bone material in beef shipments from the United
States, among the first shipments to have arrived after the ban was lifted.  The presence of
the bone material violated the procedures U.S. and Japanese officials reached that allowed
the resumption of the U.S. beef shipments.  U.S. Secretary of Agriculture Johanns expressed
regret that the prohibited material had entered the shipments. It is not clear when U.S. beef
shipments to Japan can resume. 
On February 17, 2006, the U.S. Department of Agriculture released a report of its
investigation of how the prohibited material got shipped.  Japanese officials stated that while
the report explained the incident in question it also revealed that there had been other
violations of the conditions for resumption of U.S. beef shipments, raising the possibility of
a further delay in the lifting of the ban.11  On March 10, 2006, U.S. Agriculture Secretary
Mike Johanns met with his Japanese counterpart, Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries
Minister Shoichi  Nakagawa, in London, and discussed, among other things, the current
Japanese ban on imports of U.S. beef.  He indicated that the United States was responding
to questions regarding the U.S. meat inspection procedures and how prohibited material got
into a shipment to Japan that caused Japan to impose the latest ban.  The two officials did
not indicate a time when the ban could be lifted.      
Japan imposed the original ban in December 2003, in response to the discovery of the
first U.S. case of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE or “mad cow disease”) in
Washington state.  In the months before the diagnosis in the United States, nearly a dozen
Japanese cows infected with BSE had been discovered, creating a scandal over the
Agricultural Ministry’s handling of the issue (several more Japanese BSE cases have since
emerged).  Japan had retained the ban despite ongoing negotiations and public pressure from
Bush Administration officials, a reported framework agreement (issued jointly by both
governments) in October 2004 to end it, and periodic assurances afterward by Japanese
officials to their U.S. counterparts that it would be lifted soon. 
House Agriculture Committee Chairman Bob Goodlatte stated on January 31, 2006,
urged Japan to re-open their market to U.S. beef quickly or face “a dramatic response from
the U.S. Congress.”  Senator Saxby Chambliss, chair of the Agriculture, Nutrition, and
Forestry Committee stated on February 17 that both governments  understand what caused
the “one lapse” in the U.S. resumption of beef shipments to Japan.
The Byrd Law.  Japan, together with other major trading partners, has challenged U.S.
trade laws and actions in the World Trade Organization (WTO).  For example,  Japan and
others challenged the U.S. 1916 Antidumping Law and the so-called Byrd Amendment
(which allows revenues from countervailing duty and antidumping orders to be distributed
to those who had been injured).  In both cases, the WTO ruled in Japan’s favor.  Legislation
to repeal the 1916 law was passed by the 108th Congress. In November 2004, the WTO
authorized Japan and the other countries to impose sanctions against the United States.  In
IB97004 03-31-06
12 For more information on the Byrd Amendment, see CRS Report RL33045, the Continued
Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act (“The Byrd Amendment”), by Jeanne J. Grimmett and Vivian C.
Jones.
13 This section was written by Mark Manyin.
CRS-11
September 2005, Japan imposed 15% tariffs on selected imports of U.S. steel products as
retaliation, joining the EU and Canada.  It is the first time that Japan has imposed punitive
tariffs on U.S. products. In the meantime, a repeal of the Byrd Amendment was included in
the conference report for S. 1932, the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005.  The House passed the
conference report on December 19, 2005, and the Senate is expected to take up the measure
early in the second session of the 109th Congress. The measure would phase out the
program over a period ending October 1, 2007.12 
The Doha Development Agenda.  Japan and the United States are major supporters
of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA), the latest round of negotiations in the WTO.  Yet,
the two have taken divergent positions in some critical areas of the agenda.  For example, the
United States, Australia, and other major agricultural exporting countries have pressed for
the reduction or removal of barriers to agricultural imports and subsidies of agricultural
production, a position strongly resisted  by Japan and the European Union.  At the same time,
Japan and others have argued that national antidumping laws and actions that member
countries have taken should be examined during the DDA, with the possibility of changing
them, a position that the United States has opposed.
Despite some outstanding issues, tensions in the U.S.-Japan bilateral economic
relationship have been much lower than was the case in the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s.
A number of factors  may be contributing to this trend:  Japan’s economic problems in the
1990s and in the first few years of this decade changed the general U.S. perception of Japan
as an economic “threat” to one of a country with problems; the rise of China as an economic
power has caused U.S. policymakers to shift attention from Japan to China as a source of
concern; the increased use by both Japan and the United States of the WTO as a forum for
resolving trade disputes has de-politicized disputes and helped to reduce friction; and the
emphasis in the bilateral relationship has shifted from economic to security matters.
Japanese Political Developments13
 
In general, Japan’s political peculiarities both constrain and enhance U.S. influence over
Japanese policy.  Compared to most industrialized democracies, the Japanese Diet
(parliament) is structurally weak, as is the office of the prime minister and his cabinet.
Though Koizumi and his immediate predecessors have increased politicians’ influence
relative to Japan’s bureaucrats, with important exceptions Japan’s policymaking process still
tends to be compartmentalized and bureaucratized, making it difficult to make trade-offs
among competing constituencies on divisive issues.  The result is often paralysis or
incremental changes at the margins of policy.  On some issues this can provide the United
States with an opening to use foreign pressure (gaiatsu) to break policy logjams.  
On the other hand, the nature of Japan’s policymaking process makes it difficult for
Japanese leaders to reach controversial agreements with foreign countries.  Japan’s structural
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debilities also have tended to retard its ability to act decisively and proactively in the
international sphere — often to the frustration of the United States — though this
characteristic is less pronounced today than a decade ago.  Because Prime Minister Koizumi
has centralized power to a greater extent than his predecessors, and because he has aligned
Japanese foreign policy so closely to the United States, his expected resignation in September
2006 could have a larger-than-usual impact on U.S.-Japan relations. 
Koizumi’s Sweeping Victory in September 2005 Elections.  Junichiro
Koizumi is Japan’s fourth-longest serving prime minister since 1945, and he has used his
popularity to bolster power in the prime minister’s office at the expense of the previously
powerful factions in his ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).  Koizumi’s influence
appears to have been greatly enhanced on September 11, 2005, when he led the LDP to a
landslide victory in nationwide elections for the Lower House of the Japanese parliament (the
Diet).  The LDP won 296 of 480 seats, its largest total in nearly 20 years, and 84 seats higher
than its position before the election.  The next Lower House elections are not required to be
held until September 2009.
Koizumi’s victory appears to have further weakened the LDP’s conservative “old
guard,” whose power Koizumi has gradually reduced since he came to power in 2001.
Koizumi exercised his right to call a snap Lower House election after many LDP members
helped engineer the defeat in the Upper House of his controversial proposal to privatize the
Japanese postal system.14  The LDP narrowly controls the Upper House only through a
coalition with a smaller party.  During the campaign, Koizumi successfully made his postal
privatization plan the dominant issue.  He expelled 37 “postal rebels” from the LDP,
recruiting many younger, reform-minded “assassin” candidates — including many women
—  to run against them.  Claiming a mandate for postal reform, Koizumi reintroduced and
secured passage of his postal privatization bill.
The medium-term implications of Koizumi’s victory are uncertain because he
repeatedly has stated that he will step down from his position as LDP President when his
term expires in September 2006.  (Traditionally, the LDP President assumes the
premiership.)  A number of prominent LDP members have called for rewriting the party’s
rules to allow Koizumi to extend his term, but to date Koizumi repeatedly has resisted these
entreaties, saying only that he expects his successor to advance his reform agenda.  This
includes shrinking the size of government, making the LDP more responsive to its president,
and devolving budget authority to Japan’s prefectures (states).
Koizumi’s Successor.  After his election victory, Koizumi said that he wants his
successor to carry on his reforms and that he would reshuffle his Cabinet in order to give a
chance for potential successors to gain more experience.  On October 31, 2005, he appointed
a new Cabinet, giving prominent positions to three individuals who are widely thought will
seek the LDP presidency in 2006.  Shinzo Abe (51 years old) — known for his hawkish
views on North Korea, China, and history issues — was given the important position of
Chief Cabinet Secretary, a post gives him nearly daily exposure on the Japanese media, as
well as the power to allocate the LDP’s political funds to individual politicians.  Another
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hardliner, Taro Aso (65) — who is known as an advocate of closer relations with Taiwan —
was given the Foreign Ministry portfolio.  Sadakazu Tanigaki (60) was reappointed as
Finance Minister.  Notably, another would-be prime minister, Koizumi’s former Chief
Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda (69), was left out of the Cabinet altogether. Fukuda
reportedly has advocated a somewhat more conciliatory position toward China and South
Korea and was a chief architect of Koizumi’s policy of normalizing relations with North
Korea.  Fukuda also is a member of a parliamentary league promoting the construction of a
secular national war memorial that ostensibly would allow Japanese politicians to pay their
respects to Japan’s war dead without visiting the controversial Yasukuni shrine.
Koizumi’s political authority generally is considered to have declined since the
September 2005 election, due to several factors, including the emergence of several political
and corruption scandals popularly associated with his reforms; the apparent stagnation of
many of Koizumi’s reformist measures (such as overhauling Japan’s road-building process);
the increased focus on potential successors; and the passage in March 2006 of his last budget,
which is his Cabinet’s last major piece of “must-pass” legislation.  
The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ).  The election also appeared — at least for
the moment — to stall the emergence of a two-party system in Japan.  The LDP has ruled
almost continuously since its formation in 1955.  Over the past three years, Japan’s largest
opposition party, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), seemed to be emerging as a viable
candidate to defeat the LDP.  In several elections in the early part of the decade, the DPJ
steadily increased its strength in the Diet by winning over reform-minded urban and
independent voters, who were attracted to the DPJ’s economic reform platform that in many
ways is more radical than Koizumi’s.  In the September 2005 election, however, many of
these voters opted for Koizumi’s rebranded LDP.  As a result, the DPJ lost more than one-
third of its strength; the party now has 113 seats in the Lower House, down from 175 before
the election, and the party’s leader resigned to take responsibility for the defeat.  
A week after the vote, the DPJ elected 43-year-old Seiji Maehara to be the new party
president.  The choice of Maehara, who is known as a realist on security and defense issues,
highlights the DPJ’s considerable internal tensions, particularly  between the party’s
hawkish/conservative and passivist/liberal wings.  Formed in 1998, the DPJ has yet to
transcend its legacy as an amalgamation of several smaller parties.  In the September 2005
election, the DPJ took many positions likely to cause friction with the United States if it
assumed power, including voting against Japan’s Iraq deployment, calling for a total U.S.
military withdrawal from Okinawa, and criticizing Koizumi for aligning Japan too closely
to the United States.  Maehara has indicated he will reverse some of these positions, saying
that on broad questions of foreign policy, there is little fundamental difference between his
vision and Koizumi’s.  If he is able to bring the DPJ along to this view, it is likely to reduce
the politicization of many security issues in U.S.-Japan relations.  Maehara has indicated,
however, that he favors the withdrawal of Japanese troops from Iraq.  In early 2006,
Maehara’s future as party president began to be called into question.  The DPJ will hold
another leadership election in the fall of 2006. 
Constitutional Revision.  Japan’s constitution was drafted in 1946 by the U.S.
Occupation authorities, who then imposed it on a reluctant Japanese legislature.  Since the
early 1990s, previously strong public opposition to revising the constitution has gradually
weakened and public opinion polls now show widespread support for some sort of revision.
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In October 2005, Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) released its long-awaited
draft revision of the Japanese constitution.  The most notable changes reduce many —
though not all — of the provisions in the war-renouncing clause (Article 9) that set limits on
Japan’s military activities.  After renouncing war and the “threat or use of force as a means
of settling international disputes,” the proposed revision explicitly states that Japan “shall
maintain armed forces for self-defense” that operate under the prime minister and are subject
to the Diet’s approval and direction.  The explicit mention of a military force is designed to
rectify the disconnect between the current constitution — which says that “land, sea, and air
forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained” — and the reality that Japan
possesses a Self Defense Force.  More importantly, the LDP’s draft appears to allow Japan
to participate in collective security arrangements by stating that the armed forces “may act
in international cooperation to ensure the international community’s peace and security.” 
Both the LDP and the DPJ are split between relatively hawkish and pacifist wings that
appear to be sparring over the question of whether or not conditions (such as United Nations
backing) should be attached to the right to join collective security arrangements.  In other
words, the issue is not whether, but how, Article 9 should be revised, a development that is
due in part to increased concerns about North Korea and China.  In March 2005, Japan’s
House of Representatives Research Commission on the Constitution, composed of
representatives from various parties, released a report indicating that over two-thirds of
members generally favor constitutional provisions allowing Japan to join U.N. collective
security arrangements, stipulating the Self-Defense Forces’ existence, and maintaining some
portion of the war-renouncing clause of Article 9.  A wide majority of the commission also
favored allowing women to serve as emperor, establishing stronger privacy and
environmental rights, creating a constitutional court, and revising Japan’s federalist system.
Constitutional amendments must be approved by two-thirds of each chamber, after which
they are to be “submitted to the people” for majority approval.  LDP and the DPJ officials
have expressed their support, in principle, for Koizumi’s proposal to pass by the middle of
2006 legislation detailing how a national constitutional referendum would be conducted.
Coordinating the legislation has proved difficult, however, leading some to speculate that a
measure will not be introduced before the LDP and DPJ presidential elections in September.
Conclusion — Japan’s Increased Assertiveness15
Since the late 1990s, Japan has displayed a more assertive foreign policy, a process that
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi has accelerated since coming to power in 2001.  The new
assertiveness has manifested itself in at least four notable ways.  First, under Prime Minister
Koizumi, Japan has intensified its cooperation with the United States, and Koizumi has
developed a strong personal relationship with President Bush.  Second, Tokyo has hardened
its policies toward Beijing, slashing its bilateral aid program, not backing down from
territorial and historical disputes, and reorienting the U.S.-Japan alliance to give both
countries more flexibility to respond to perceived and actual threats from China.  Third,
Japan has attempted to exert more influence in Southeast Asia and on the global stage, as
evidenced by its pursuit of a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council and its negotiation
of free trade agreements (FTAs) with a number of Southeast Asian countries.  Fourth,
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Japanese leaders have sought to make Japan a more “normal” country by legitimizing the
military’s ability to participate in collective security arrangements and take actions — such
as firing at hostile foreign ships in Japanese waters — that most other nations take for
granted.  Currently, Japan’s military role is highly conscribed by the constitution’s war-
renouncing clause of Article 9.  
The motivations for Japan’s increasing foreign policy assertiveness are both external
and internal.  Domestically, Koizumi has found that breaking from Japan’s traditionally
passive foreign policy posture has played well with politically influential right-of-center —
not to mention right-wing — groups.  Many elements of his policies also have resonated
among the population as a whole, as ordinary Japanese have become much more security
conscious since North Korea’s missile launch in 1998.  In general, the negative implications
of China’s economic and military rise are viewed with deepening concern in Japan,
particularly when seen against the backdrop of Japan’s decade-long economic slump.  Many
Japanese worry that they gradually are ceding leadership in East Asia to China, and that the
after-effects of this shift will harm Japanese interests.  In the shorter term, anxieties have
been raised by the intensifying disputes with China and by North Korea’s nuclear weapons
and missile programs. 
In general, the Bush Administration has encouraged Tokyo’s rising assertiveness, which
thus far has tended to dovetail with U.S. interests in the strategic realm.  In the future,
however, it is likely that a more active Japan will be more willing to question U.S. policies
on a range of strategic issues where U.S. and Japanese interests do not coincide or where
domestic factors push Japanese leaders to avoid being perceived as being too close to the
United States. 
LEGISLATION
P.L. 109-5 (S. 384).  Extends the existence of the Nazi War Crimes and Japanese
Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group for two years.  Passed by both
houses and signed into law by President Bush in March 2005.
P.L. 109-97 (H.R. 2744).  The Agriculture Appropriations Act of 2006.  Signed into
law (P.L. 109-97) November 10, 2005.  The Senate-passed version included two
amendments, adopted on September 20, 2005, that would have denied funds to implement
a rule to lift the U.S. ban on Japanese beef until Japan has lifted its ban on imports of U.S.
beef (S.Amdt. 1732 agreed to by a vote of 72-26); and that expressed the sense of the Senate
that the U.S. ban on imported Japanese beef should remain in place until Japan has lifted its
ban on imports of U.S. beef (S.Amdt. 1738, agreed to by voice vote).  House and Senate
conferees did not include either amendment in the final bill, though the conference report
(H.Rept. 109-255) says Congress “clearly reserve[s] the right to impose restrictions similar
to those suggested by the Senate if there is not a swift resolution to this issue.”
P.L. 109-114 (H.R. 2528). Veterans Affairs Appropriations Act of 2006.  Section 118
requires the Defense Department to report by February 15 on U.S. efforts to encourage Japan
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and other allied countries to increase their share of the allied defense burden.  Became public
law on November 30, 2005.
H.Con.Res. 68 (Evans).  Expresses the sense of Congress that the Government of Japan
should formally issue a clear and unambiguous apology for the sexual enslavement of
“comfort women” during the colonial occupation of Asia.  Introduced March 17, 2005;
referred to House Asia Pacific Subcommittee.
H.Con.Res. 168 (Hyde).  Condemns the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea for
the abductions and continued captivity of citizens of the Republic of Korea and Japan.
Passed by the House (362-1) on July 11, 2005; referred to Senate Foreign Relations
Committee.
H.Con.Res. 191 (Hyde).  Commemorates the 60th anniversary of the conclusion of the
War in the Pacific and reaffirms the judgments rendered by the International Military
Tribunal for the Far East of 1946-1948, including the conviction of certain individuals as war
criminals.  Passed by the House (399-0) on July 14, 2005; referred to the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations.
H.Con.Res. 311 (Ramstad)/S.Con.Res. 67 (Coleman).  Urges Japan to honor its
commitments under a 1986 bilateral agreement on medical equipment and pharmaceuticals.
House bill introduced December 7, 2005; referred to House Ways and Means Committee.
Senate bill introduced November 18, 2005; referred to Foreign Relations Committee.
H.Res. 137 (Moran)/S.Res. 87 (Thune).  Express the sense of the respective Houses
of Congress that the U.S. government should impose economic sanctions against Japan, if
Japan does not lift its ban on U.S. beef.  Neither resolution has seen committee action.
H.Res. 321(Leach).  Expresses support for a “regionally balanced expansion” of the
membership of the United Nations Security Council, which would include adding Japan,
India, Germany, Brazil, and an African country.  Introduced June 15, 2005; referred to the
House Committee on International Relations. 
H.R. 30 (Mica).  To provide compensation for certain World War II veterans who
survived the Bataan Death March and were held as prisoners of war by the Japanese.
Introduced January 4, 2005; referred to House Committee on Armed Services.  Similar
legislation in the 108th Congress (H.R. 595) did not see action outside of committee.
H.R. 4179 (Salazar) and S. 1922 (Conrad).  Require the President to impose extra
tariffs on various Japanese products beginning on January 1, 2006, if Japan has not lifted its
ban on imports of U.S. beef.  H.R. 4179 introduced October 28, 2005; referred to House
Ways and Means Committee. S. 1922 introduced October 26, 2005; referred to Senate
Finance Committee.
S. 377 (Lieberman).  Requires negotiation and appropriate action with Japan, China,
and other countries that have engaged in currency manipulation.  Introduced February 15,
2005; referred to Senate Finance Committee.
